Search Evasion Techniques
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Misusing Structured Exception Handlers Anti-Disassembly
Misusing Structured Exception Handlers is a technique used by malware to make it more difficult for security analysts to reverse engineer the code. Structured Exception Handlers (SEH) are functions that are used to handle exceptions in a program. These can be misused by malware to fool disassemblers and make it harder to analyze the code. One way this is done …
AddVectoredExceptionHandler Anti-Debugging
The AddVectoredExceptionHandler technique is an anti-debugging method that can detect the presence of debuggers using Vectored Exception Handlers. This technique works by calling AddVectoredExceptionHandler(1, ourHandler) to register a top-level exception handler that will catch any exceptions raised by the process, including those generated by debuggers.
After this call has taken place, stepping through the code will trigger an EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP exception, …
Obscuring Control Flow Anti-Disassembly
Obscuring control flow is an anti-disassembling technique that involves using methods of flow control that are difficult or impossible for disassemblers and debuggers to follow. This can make it more difficult for analysts to understand the program's behavior and can also make it more difficult for other tools, such as debuggers, to accurately interpret the program.
One example of this …
Unhandled Exception Filter Anti-Debugging
An application-defined function that passes unhandled exceptions to the debugger, if the process is being debugged. Otherwise, it optionally displays an application error message box and causes the exception handler to be executed.
If an exception occurs and no exception handler is registered, the UnhandledExceptionFilter function will be called. It is possible to register a custom unhandled exception filter using …
CloseHandle, NtClose Anti-Debugging
When a process is debugged, calling NtClose or CloseHandle with an invalid handle will generate a STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception.
The exception can be cached by an exception handler. If the control is passed to the exception handler, it indicates that a debugger is present.
INT3 Instruction Scanning Anti-Debugging
Instruction INT3 is an interruption which is used as Software breakpoints. These breakpoints are set by modifying the code at the target address, replacing it with a byte value 0xCC (INT3 / Breakpoint Interrupt).
The exception EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT (0x80000003) is generated, and an exception handler will be raised. Malware identify software breakpoints by scanning for the byte 0xCC in the protector …
Call to Interrupt Procedure Anti-Debugging
This anti-debugging technique involves using the INT n instruction to generate a call to the interrupt or exception handler specified with the destination operand.
To implement this technique, the int 0x03 instruction is executed, followed by a ret (0xCD03, 0xC3) nested in a __try, __except block. If a debugger is present, the except block will not be executed, and …
Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path Defense Evasion [Mitre]
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
Service paths and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path …
Extra Window Memory Injection Process Manipulating
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).
Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of Extra Window Memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance …
EventPairHandles Anti-Debugging
An EventPair Object is an event constructed by two _KEVENT structures which are conventionally named High and Low.
There is a relation between generic Event Objects and Debuggers because they must create a custom event called DebugEvent able to handle exceptions. Due to the presence of events owned by the Debugger, every information relative to the events of a normal …