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Process Injection: Extra Window Memory Injection
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate …
Read moreProcess Injection: Process Hollowing
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. …
Read moreProcess Injection: ListPlanting
Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate …
Read moreHell's Gate
The Hell's Gate technique refers to a specific method used by malware authors to make their software more difficult to detect and analyze. The technique involves the use of a custom native API resolver to resolve Windows API functions at runtime dynamically.
By using Hell's Gate, malware can avoid referencing the Windows API functions directly in the Import Address …
Read moreEvasion using direct Syscalls
In the Windows operating system, conventional malware frequently utilizes strategies involving the invocation of specific functions from the kernel32.dll library, such as VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, and CreateThread. A closer inspection of the call stack reveals that the functions employed from kernel32.dll eventually trigger corresponding functions within the ntdll.dll library. This is facilitated by the ntdll.dll library, which serves …