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Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable
![Defense Evasion [Mitre] icon](/media/2024/04/08/icons8-burglar.svg){kind=small}
Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads. The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded.
An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process …
Read moreDebugger Evasion
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, if the adversary detects a debugger, …
Read moreObfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads
Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.
Adversaries …
Read moreReflective Code Loading
Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs …
Read moreSystem Binary Proxy Execution: Mavinject
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. Dynamic-link Library Injection), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL). …
Read moreDetecting Virtual Environment Artefacts
Malware often checks for artifacts left by virtualization platforms to determine if it is running inside a virtual environment. Detecting such artifacts allows the malware to adapt its behavior, delay execution, or avoid exposing malicious functionality during analysis.
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QEMU: QEMU registers artifacts in the Windows registry. For example, the key
HARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 0\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical …
CPUID
The CPUID instruction is a low-level command that allows you to retrieve information about the CPU that is currently running. This instruction, which is executed at the CPU level (using the bytecode 0FA2), is available on all processors that are based on the Pentium architecture or newer.
You can use the CPUID instruction to retrieve various pieces of information …
Read moreAdding antivirus exception
This technique involves searching for active antivirus-related processes or modules and terminating execution if any are found. By detecting loaded antivirus libraries, malware can determine whether it is running in a monitored environment and exit to avoid detection.
Read moreIsDebuggerPresent
This function checks specific flag in the Process Environment Block (PEB) for the field IsDebugged which will return zero if the process is not running into a debugger or a nonzero if a debugger is attached.
If you want to understand the underlying process of IsDebuggerPresent API you can check the code snippet section for the following method: IsDebugged …
Read moreCheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent is a kernel32.dll function that sets (-1)0xffffffff in the DebuggerPresent parameter if a debugger is present. Internally, it also uses NtQueryInformationProcess with ProcessDebugPort as a ProcessInformationClass parameter.
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