rule shadow_copy_deletion {
meta:
description = "Detect shadow copy deletion"
author = "ditekSHen/Unprotect"
strings:
$x1 = "cmd.exe /c \"vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all /quiet\"" fullword ascii
$x2 = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" fullword ascii
$cmd1 = "cmd /c \"WMIC.exe shadowcopy delet\"" ascii wide nocase
$cmd2 = "vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all" ascii wide nocase
$cmd3 = "Delete Shadows /all" ascii wide nocase
$cmd4 = "} recoveryenabled no" ascii wide nocase
$cmd5 = "} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures" ascii wide nocase
$cmd6 = "wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE" ascii wide nocase
$cmd7 = "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SystemRestore\\SR\" /disable" ascii wide nocase
$cmd8 = "resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=" ascii wide nocase
$cmd9 = "shadowcopy where \"ID='%s'\" delete" ascii wide nocase
$cmd10 = "wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive" ascii wide nocase
$cmd11 = "WMIC.exe shadowcopy delete" ascii wide nocase
$cmd12 = "Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();}" ascii wide nocase
$delr = /del \/s \/f \/q(( [A-Za-z]:\\(\*\.|[Bb]ackup))(VHD|bac|bak|wbcat|bkf)?)+/ ascii wide
$wp1 = "delete catalog -quiet" ascii wide nocase
$wp2 = "wbadmin delete backup" ascii wide nocase
$wp3 = "delete systemstatebackup" ascii wide nocase
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and 2 of ($cmd*) or (1 of ($cmd*) and 1 of ($wp*)) or #delr > 4) or (4 of them)
}
title: Delete Shadow Copy Via Powershell
status: experimental
description: Delete Shadow Copy Via Powershell
author: Joe Security
date: 2019-10-25
id: 200011
threatname:
behaviorgroup: 18
classification: 8
mitreattack: T1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine:
- '*powershell*RwBlAHQALQBXAG0AaQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAbwB3AGMAbwBwAHkAIAB8ACAARgBvAHIARQBhAGMAaAAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAewAkAF8ALgBEAGUAbABlAHQAZQAoACkAOwB9AA==*'
condition: selection
level: critical
title: Delete Volume Shadow Copies Via WMI With PowerShell
id: 87df9ee1-5416-453a-8a08-e8d4a51e9ce1
description: Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities via PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_shadow_copies_deletion.yml
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stomping-shadow-copies-a-second-look-into-deletion-methods
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
status: experimental
author: frack113
date: 2021/06/03
modified: 2021/10/16
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_classic_start
definition: fields have to be extract from event
detection:
selection_obj:
HostApplication|contains|all:
- 'Get-WmiObject'
- ' Win32_Shadowcopy'
selection_del:
HostApplication|contains:
- 'Delete()'
- 'Remove-WmiObject'
condition: selection_obj and selection_del
fields:
- HostApplication
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason
level: critical
title: Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities
id: c947b146-0abc-4c87-9c64-b17e9d7274a2
status: stable
description: Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities
author: Florian Roth, Michael Haag, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2019/10/22
modified: 2021/10/24
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/new-teslacrypt-ransomware-arrives-via-spam/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/why-everyone-should-disable-vssadmin-exe-now/
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine#the-process
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/main/yara/gen_ransomware_command_lines.yar
- https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.impact
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\vssadmin.exe'
- '\diskshadow.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- shadow # will match "delete shadows" and "shadowcopy delete" and "shadowstorage"
- delete
selection2:
Image|endswith:
- '\wbadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- delete
- catalog
- quiet # will match -quiet or /quiet
selection3:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- resize
- shadowstorage
- unbounded
condition: 1 of selection*
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentCommandLine
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason
level: critical
rule:
meta:
name: delete volume shadow copies
namespace: impact/inhibit-system-recovery
author: moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope: function
att&ck:
- Impact::Inhibit System Recovery [T1490]
- Defense Evasion::Indicator Removal on Host::File Deletion [T1070.004]
mbc:
- Impact::Data Destruction::Delete Shadow Copies [E1485.m04]
examples:
- B87E9DD18A5533A09D3E48A7A1EFBCF6:0x140006AF0
features:
- or:
- string: /vssadmin.* delete shadows/i
- string: /vssadmin.* resize shadowstorage/i
- string: /wmic.* shadowcopy delete/i
![Defense Evasion [Mitre] icon](/media/2024/04/08/icons8-burglar.svg){kind=small}