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Detecting Virtual Environment Files Sandbox Evasion

Some files are created by Virtualbox and VMware on the system.

Malware can check the different folders to find Virtualbox artifacts like VBoxMouse.sys.

Malware can check the different folders to find VMware artifacts like vmmouse.sys, vmhgfs.sys.

Some Files Example

Below is a list of files that can be detected on virtual machines:

  • "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\agent.pyw",
  • …

Detecting Virtual Environment Artefacts Sandbox Evasion

Qemu registers some artifacts into the registry. A malware can detect the Qemu installation with a look at the registry key HARDWARE\\DEVICEMAP\\Scsi\\Scsi Port 0\\Scsi Bus 0\\Target Id 0\\Logical Unit Id 0 with the value of Identifier and the data of QEMU or HARDWARE\\Description\\System with a value of SystemBiosVersion and data of QEMU.

The VirtualBox Guest addition leaves many …

VPCEXT Sandbox Evasion

The VPCEXT instruction (visual property container extender) is another anti–virtual machine trick used by malware to detect virtual systems. This technique is not documented. If the execution of the instruction does not generate an exception (illegal instruction), then the program is running on a virtual machine.

Onset Delay Sandbox Evasion

Malware will delay execution to avoid analysis by the sample. For example, a Ping can be perform during a time defined. Unlike extended sleep that will use the Sleep function, onset delay will use another way to delay execution.

The purpose of such evasive code is to delay the execution of malicious activity long enough so that automated analysis …

Checking Memory Size Sandbox Evasion

Most modern user machines have at least 4GB of memory. Malware programs can detect whether they are running in a sandbox environment by checking the available memory size. If the available memory size is less than 4GB, it is likely that the program is running in a sandbox.

Checking Hard Drive Size Sandbox Evasion

Many user machines have hard drives that are larger than 80GB. A malware program can detect whether it is running in a virtual environment by checking the size of the hard drive. If the size is less than 80GB, it is likely that the program is running in a sandbox or virtual environment.

Fake Signature Antivirus/EDR Evasion

Every exe file contain metadata that allow users to trust the third party that distribute the program. Malware are able to usurp the metadata in order to fool the user but also the security tools.

RDTSC Anti-Debugging

The Read-Time-Stamp-Counter (RDTSC) instruction can be used by malware to determine how quicky the processor executes the program's instructions. It returns the count of the number of ticks since the last system reboot as a 64-bit value placed into EDX:EAX.

It will execute RDTSC twice and then calculate the difference between low order values and check it with …

TLS Callback Anti-Debugging

TLS (Thread Local Storage) callbacks are a mechanism in Windows that allows a program to define a function that will be called when a thread is created. These callbacks can be used to perform various tasks, such as initializing thread-specific data or modifying the behavior of the thread.

As an anti-debugging technique, a program can use a TLS callback …

Unhandled Exception Filter Anti-Debugging

An application-defined function that passes unhandled exceptions to the debugger, if the process is being debugged. Otherwise, it optionally displays an application error message box and causes the exception handler to be executed.

If an exception occurs and no exception handler is registered, the UnhandledExceptionFilter function will be called. It is possible to register a custom unhandled exception filter …


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